The expected military resistance, environmental dangers, and political consequences mean that any such mission—if ever contemplated—would represent the most technically demanding and strategically sensitive special‑operations undertaking in modern history.
By Hezy Laing
The prospect of a joint United States–Israeli commando operation to extract deeply buried enriched‑uranium stockpiles under hostile fire represents one of the most complex and unprecedented mission profiles ever discussed in modern counter‑proliferation planning.
Although neither Washington nor Jerusalem publicly confirms operational details, officials and analysts have long acknowledged that both nations maintain elite units capable of penetrating fortified nuclear sites such as Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom, buried under an estimated 80–90 meters of rock and reinforced concrete.
Fordow, first exposed by Western intelligence in 2009, houses IR‑2m and IR‑6 centrifuge cascades and has produced uranium enriched to 60 percent U‑235, according to IAEA reports from 2021–2023.
Any hypothetical extraction mission would rely on a fusion of American units such as Delta Force and SEAL Team Six with Israeli formations like Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, and Yahalom, the IDF Engineering Corps’ elite tunnel and EOD specialists.
These units have previously cooperated in intelligence sharing and joint training, including subterranean warfare exercises at the IDF’s Tze’elim base and U.S. Central Command facilities in Nevada and North Carolina.
The logistical challenge of reaching a hardened enrichment hall—protected by IRGC Aerospace Force units, air‑defense systems like the Bavar‑373, and layers of underground blast doors—would require synchronized air support, cyber disruption, and precision strikes to suppress surface defenses.
The extraction of enriched uranium under fire is considered far more difficult than a standard sabotage mission.
Uranium hexafluoride cylinders, centrifuge rotors, and control‑system hardware are fragile, toxic, and extremely sensitive to heat and shock.
U.S. nuclear‑forensics teams from the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration have previously deployed to conflict zones, including Iraq in 2003, to secure radiological materials, but never under the conditions of an active, fortified nuclear site.
Israeli planners have studied historical precedents such as Operation Orchard in 2007, when the IAF destroyed Syria’s Al‑Kibar reactor, and the 2018 Mossad raid that extracted 55,000 pages of Iran’s nuclear archive from a Tehran warehouse.
Yet even that dramatic operation did not involve removing active enriched material from a live facility.
A joint U.S.–Israeli commando extraction of buried uranium would therefore represent a mission without historical parallel—combining nuclear forensics, special operations, and high‑intensity conflict in a single, extraordinarily risky undertaking.
A U.S.–Israeli commando mission to extract enriched uranium from a deeply buried, heavily defended nuclear site would require an unprecedented level of coordination, technological integration, and real‑time intelligence fusion.
Analysts emphasize that such an operation, if ever attempted, would resemble a hybrid of counter‑proliferation, special operations, and high‑intensity conflict rather than a traditional raid.
The approach would likely begin with extensive ISR coverage from U.S. assets such as RC‑135 Rivet Joint aircraft, RQ‑170 Sentinel drones, and geospatial intelligence from the National Geospatial‑Intelligence Agency, combined with Israeli Ofeq satellites and Unit 9900 visual‑intelligence specialists.
These systems would map subterranean layouts, identify IRGC defensive patterns, and track rapid‑response units.
Any insertion under fire would face formidable resistance.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is responsible for securing nuclear sites, maintains layered defenses including the Bavar‑373 and Khordad‑15 surface‑to‑air systems, anti‑aircraft artillery, electronic‑warfare units, and rapid‑reaction infantry battalions.
Underground, the defenders could include IRGC Aerospace Force personnel trained to protect centrifuge halls and tunnel networks.
The confined environment, combined with the presence of toxic uranium hexafluoride and high‑voltage centrifuge arrays, would create hazards beyond enemy fire.
Even if commandos reached the enrichment chambers, they would face the challenge of securing sensitive materials while under pressure from counterattacks, reinforcements, and possible attempts to seal or flood tunnels.
Military historians often compare the theoretical complexity of such a mission to the 2011 Abbottabad raid on Osama bin Laden, Operation Thunderbolt at Entebbe in 1976, and the 2018 Mossad nuclear‑archive extraction, yet all agree that none of these operations involved the combination of deep‑earth penetration, nuclear‑material handling, and sustained combat.
The expected resistance, environmental dangers, and political consequences mean that any such mission—if ever contemplated—would represent the most technically demanding and strategically sensitive special‑operations undertaking in modern history.
