In January 2026, Iraq renewed its security pact with Tehran, forcing Kurdish Iranian opposition groups to disarm and relocate away from the border.

By Hezy Laing

By 2026, the covert Israeli strategy of supplying weapons and intelligence to armed opponents of the Iranian regime had become one of the most openly analyzed components of the regional shadow war.

Former IDF and Mossad officials recently acknowledged that Israel has, for years, provided support to groups operating along Iran’s borders.

These groups included Baluchi group from Jaish al‑Adl, Ahvazi Arab factions in Khuzestan, and at various points Kurdish organizations such as Komala and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI).

The objective was to “stretch the IRGC thin and force it to defend multiple fronts simultaneously.”

Many of the weapons reaching the anti‑regime groups originated from captured Hamas and Hezbollah arsenals.

After the October 7 attacks and the subsequent Gaza operations, the IDF seized thousands of rifles, RPGs, explosives and Iranian‑manufactured munitions from Hamas stockpiles.

Along the northern border, Israeli forces captured Hezbollah weapons including Fajr‑3 rockets, Malyutka anti‑tank missiles, and Iranian‑supplied small arms.

Intelligence officials confirmed anonymously that a portion of these captured weapons, after forensic cataloging, was diverted through third‑party channels in Iraqi Kurdistan to groups fighting the IRGC.

The logic, according to one senior official, was to “turn Iran’s own weapons back against its internal security forces.”

Despite speculation throughout 2025 that Kurdish groups would launch a coordinated offensive against Tehran, such an attack never occurred.

The expectation peaked during Iran’s 2025 economic crisis, when analysts believed the KDPI and Komala might exploit the regime’s vulnerability.

Yet by mid‑2026, KDPI political bureau member Khalid Azizi stated publicly that the group lacked “strategic depth and international guarantees.”

Komala leader Abdullah Mohtadi emphasized that Iran’s 2022–2024 missile and drone strikes on Kurdish bases in Koya and Erbil had left the movement militarily constrained.

Iraqi pressure proved decisive.

In January 2026, Baghdad renewed its security pact with Tehran, forcing Kurdish Iranian opposition groups to disarm and relocate away from the border.

With mobility restricted and bases monitored, the Kurds concluded that a full‑scale uprising was untenable, regardless of Israeli assistance.