Ceasefire agreements with Lebanon are useless, analysts say
By Hezy Laing
Encouraged by US President Donald Trump, Israel and Lebanon recently reached a ceasefire agreement aimed at reducing cross‑border tensions.
The arrangement followed weeks of escalating exchanges between the IDF and Hezbollah.
While the deal seeks to restore stability along the northern border, its long‑term effectiveness remains uncertain given Lebanon’s internal challenges and Hezbollah’s independent operations.
According to a range of Israeli security analysts, the idea of a new ceasefire agreement with Lebanon is largely meaningless.
Their argument rests on a simple but decisive point: Israel is not at war with Lebanon — it is at war with Hezbollah.
And Hezbollah is not an actor the Lebanese state can restrain, disarm, or meaningfully influence.
Analysts frequently note that Lebanon has repeatedly demonstrated its inability to enforce any sovereign authority over Hezbollah.
Since the end of the 2006 war, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 required the disarmament of all armed groups south of the Litani River.
Yet Hezbollah not only remained armed, it expanded its arsenal dramatically.
Israeli intelligence estimates that the organization now possesses over 150,000 rockets and missiles, along with advanced drones and precision‑guided systems.
None of this buildup was prevented by the Lebanese government or the international community.
For this reason, experts argue that a ceasefire “with Lebanon” is structurally irrelevant.
Lebanon cannot guarantee calm on its southern border because it does not control the force responsible for the fighting.
Hezbollah’s military decisions are shaped by its own leadership and by Iranian strategic interests, not by the Lebanese cabinet or parliament.
As several analysts put it, signing a ceasefire with Beirut is like “signing a contract with someone who has no keys to the building.”
While Israel’s northern communities are benefitting form the ceasefire – it is they themselves who want the IDF to continue to destroy the Hezbollah terrorists firing rockets at their communities.
Furthermore, past ceasefires have shown that Hezbollah uses periods of quiet not to de‑escalate, but to rearm, fortify, and prepare for the next confrontation.
Israeli analysts point to the years after 2006 as a clear example: Hezbollah rebuilt its military infrastructure under the cover of diplomatic agreements that Lebanon was unable to enforce.
This leads many experts to conclude that any new ceasefire agreement would be symbolic at best and counterproductive at worst.
Without the ability — or willingness — of the Lebanese state to disarm Hezbollah, enforce UN resolutions, or prevent Iranian entrenchment, a ceasefire becomes a document with no mechanism behind it.
The core problem is not the absence of agreements — it is the absence of a sovereign Lebanese authority capable of upholding them.
In the absence of such an entity, the IDF must take control and end the decades-old Hezbollah threat to its northern communities.
