The Israel–Lebanon agreement requires Israel to withdraw from the areas it captured in southern Lebanon in 2026 and transfer control to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

By Hezy Laing

Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben‑Gvir has become the most forceful internal government opponent of the June 2026 U.S.-brokered “Washington/Barak Framework,” insisting that no diplomatic arrangement can disarm Hezbollah and that only the IDF is capable of doing so.

The Israel–Lebanon agreement requires Israel to withdraw from the areas it captured in southern Lebanon in 2026 and transfer control to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

The LAF is expected to deploy across the vacated territory, assume full security responsibility, and enforce limits on armed groups south of the Litani River. This includes seizing or dismantling Hezbollah’s weapons in the zone and preventing the group from rebuilding its military infrastructure along the border.

But immediately after the agreement was signed, Ben-Gvir condemned it as a disaster whose consequences would echo for generations and as a historic missed opportunity to eliminate Hezbollah at a moment of unprecedented vulnerability.

His criticism begins with the structure of the Lebanese state itself, which he argues is too deeply intertwined with Hezbollah to be trusted with disarmament responsibilities.

On his official Telegram channel, he pointed out that members of the Lebanese cabinet are Hezbollah ministers, making it impossible, in his view, for Beirut to order its own military to dismantle the organization that effectively dominates the state.

Ben‑Gvir also rejects Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s portrayal of the agreement as a diplomatic achievement, insisting instead that it rescues Hezbollah precisely when the IDF had degraded it to its lowest point since its founding in 1982.

Halting the offensive, he argues, hands Hezbollah the ceasefire it desperately sought, allowing it to rebuild command structures, rearm through underground routes, and recover from battlefield losses.

For this reason, he has demanded that the framework be brought before the full Security Cabinet for a formal vote, insisting that any territorial or strategic commitments must be approved by the ministers representing the governing coalition.

Even if the IDF temporarily maintains control of the newly created buffer zone in southern Lebanon, he believes the agreement is fundamentally flawed because it shifts responsibility for Israel’s security onto foreign actors rather than Israel’s own military.

Ben‑Gvir frequently cites the historical failure of international guarantees to protect northern Israeli communities, arguing that diplomatic promises have repeatedly collapsed under pressure.

In the weeks preceding the deal, he called for an unrestricted military campaign rather than one constrained by American demands for de‑escalation.

After four Israeli soldiers were wounded in southern Lebanon, he urged an immediate end to truce discussions, declaring that Israel must make clear that the lives of its soldiers and the safety of its citizens are not bargaining chips.

His position has been strongly reinforced by senior security analysts, including Major General (Res.) Gershon Hacohen, a former IDF corps commander and strategist at the BESA Center.

Hacohen argues that diplomatic frameworks fail because they misread Hezbollah as a political actor open to compromise, when in fact the organization is driven by ideology, faith, and jihad, making permanent concessions impossible.

In his analysis, treaties do not eliminate Hezbollah’s will to fight; they merely pause it, allowing the group to rebuild.

He warns that even if Israel destroys 90 percent of Hezbollah’s arsenal, leaving the remaining 10 percent intact under diplomatic protection simply resets the hourglass for the next war.

Hacohen also rejects the notion that Hezbollah can be contained along the border, arguing that allowing a guerrilla army to sit directly opposite Israeli towns forces Israel into a reactive posture where the enemy dictates the timing and scale of escalation.

For Hacohen, only ground maneuvers can dismantle a decentralized militant network embedded in sovereign territory, and no foreign military will ever deploy its soldiers to clear southern Lebanon on Israel’s behalf.

That responsibility, he insists, falls solely on the IDF.

Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi of the Alma Research Center adds further concerns, She notes that any Lebanese Armed Forces directive to disarm Hezbollah is effectively impossible because such an action would be framed as an attack on the Shiite community, risking civil war.

Alma’s researchers have documented repeated cases in which the Lebanese military misreported enforcement actions to Israel, with IDF units later discovering intact launch pads and restored infrastructure, suggesting that the LAF acted as a protective buffer for Hezbollah rather than a counterforce.

They also highlight the vast subterranean tunnel network built with Iranian and North Korean assistance, a system that requires specialized IDF engineering units to locate and neutralize.

International monitors or Lebanese police lack both the equipment and the political mandate to address it.

In Zehavi’s assessment, Hezbollah views ceasefires not as steps toward peace but as opportunities to preserve and rebuild its remaining capabilities—an approach that can only be countered by sustained Israeli military pressure.