Baykar’s engineers studied the operational behavior, mission profiles, and sensor integration of the Heron—particularly its electro‑optical payloads and long‑endurance flight characteristics
By Hezy Laing
Turkey’s rise as a global drone superpower is one of the most dramatic military‑industrial transformations of the 21st century, and its origins trace directly to a period of dependence on Israeli UAVs followed by a determined effort to replace, replicate, and surpass them.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey had no indigenous unmanned‑aircraft industry and relied heavily on Israeli systems such as the IAI Searcher and later the IAI Heron.
Israel supplied Turkey with “Searcher and Heron UAVs, along with training and maintenance teams,” giving the Turkish military its first operational intelligence‑surveillance‑reconnaissance (ISR) capability.
Drews and other analysts note that Israeli technicians were responsible for keeping these drones airworthy, and when political relations deteriorated after the 2008–2009 Gaza War and the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, maintenance visits stopped.
This crisis became the turning point.
A 2025 analysis in Medium’s Turkey Diplomacy Review explains that Ankara “accelerated domestic UAV development to end reliance on Israeli systems,” channeling state contracts to Baykar Makina and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI).
Baykar’s engineers studied the operational behavior, mission profiles, and sensor integration of the Heron—particularly its electro‑optical payloads and long‑endurance flight characteristics.
While no source claims literal hardware copying, multiple defense analysts argue that Turkey reverse‑engineered the operational concepts of Israeli drones: long‑loiter surveillance, lightweight airframes, and modular payload bays.
TAI’s Anka program, launched in 2010, was explicitly designed to replace the Heron in Turkish service, matching its endurance (24 hours) and payload capacity (200 kg).
Baykar’s Bayraktar TB2, first flown in 2014, adopted a similar MALE‑class profile but added cheaper composite materials and simplified avionics, enabling mass production.
By 2020, Turkey had exported drones to over 30 countries, including Ukraine, Qatar, Poland, and Azerbaijan.
As of today, Turkey has supplied more attack drones than any other country, surpassing Israel in global sales.
What began as reliance on Israeli UAVs evolved into a deliberate strategy: learn from foreign systems, replicate their strengths, and build a domestic industry capable of outperforming its original teachers.
This would not be the last time Turkey stole tech – Turkey’s Altay tank program used South Korean engines and transmission technology after earlier attempts to replicate German MTU systems failed.
Meanwhile, it’s T129 ATAK helicopter is based on the Italian A129 Mangusta, with Turkish avionics added.
In several cases, foreign partners accused Turkey of using licensed technology to develop unlicensed derivatives.
European cybersecurity reports describe Turkish state‑linked groups targeting defense contractors in Germany, Italy, and the UK.
These operations focused on missile guidance, composite materials, and aviation software.
Public reporting avoids the term “espionage,” but the pattern matches state‑sponsored industrial intelligence gathering.
