Together they shape the depth, mobility, and survivability of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and define the IDF’s evolving concept of a northern security zone.
By Hezy Laing
Three rivers: the Litani, Zahrani, and Saluki rivers form the geographic backbone of southern Lebanon, and each has taken on heightened strategic significance for the IDF during the 2023–2026 confrontation with Hezbollah.
Together they shape the depth, mobility, and survivability of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and define the IDF’s evolving concept of a northern security zone.
The Litani River, Lebanon’s longest internal waterway at roughly 170 kilometers, has been the central reference point for international diplomacy since UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which requires Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani.
For the IDF, the Litani represents the minimum acceptable buffer line because Hezbollah’s Radwan forces, anti‑tank teams, and rocket units have repeatedly operated south of it in defiance of the resolution.
The IDF now maintains control of the Israeli side of the border opposite the Litani’s southern approaches, including Metula, Kiryat Shmona, Misgav Am, Margaliot, and the Hula Valley, enabling persistent surveillance of Hezbollah movements in the Litani valley and rapid strike capability against units attempting to move southward.
North of the Litani lies the Zahrani River, a shorter but strategically vital waterway flowing into the Mediterranean south of Sidon.
The Zahrani valley contains fuel depots, weapons storage sites, and logistical corridors linking Nabatieh to the coast.
Israeli officials have stated repeatedly since late 2024 that a durable post‑war arrangement must push Hezbollah north of the Zahrani, not merely the Litani, to prevent the group from launching explosive drones, precision‑guided munitions, and long‑range rockets into northern Israel.
The IDF now controls the Israeli territory opposite the Zahrani axis, including elevated observation points near Malkia, Ramot Naftali, Yiftah, and Dishon, which provide line‑of‑sight into Hezbollah’s mid‑tier infrastructure and allow early detection of drone launches from the Zahrani basin.
Thirdly there is Wadi Saluki, one of the most famous and tactically significant valleys in southern Lebanon from the IDF’s perspective, primarily because of the Battle of Wadi Saluki during the 2006 Second Lebanon War.
The wadi runs roughly east–west between Ghandouriyeh, Froun, and Haddatha, cutting through steep, rugged terrain that creates a natural defensive corridor.
For the IDF, Wadi Saluki has become a symbol of the challenges posed by Hezbollah’s anti‑tank warfare, its fortified villages, and the difficulty of maneuvering armored forces in Lebanon’s broken topography.
The most defining moment came on August 12, 2006, when the IDF’s 401st Armored Brigade, including Merkava Mk 4 tanks from the 9th Battalion, attempted to cross the wadi under heavy Hezbollah fire.
Hezbollah fighters, operating from concealed positions in Ghandouriyeh and the surrounding ridgelines, used Russian‑made Kornet‑E anti‑tank guided missiles, which inflicted significant damage. Eleven Israeli soldiers were killed and multiple tanks were hit.
The battle became one of the most studied engagements of the war, demonstrating Hezbollah’s ability to combine terrain, anti‑tank missiles, and decentralized command to blunt Israeli armored advances.
For the IDF, Wadi Saluki represents a textbook example of how Hezbollah uses Lebanon’s geography to create kill zones, channel movement, and ambush armored columns.
The steep sides of the wadi, the limited crossing points, and the dense vegetation make it ideal for anti‑tank teams.
Since 2006, the IDF has incorporated lessons from Wadi Saluki into its training, emphasizing combined‑arms coordination, infantry‑armor integration, and the need for real‑time intelligence before entering constricted terrain.
In the 2023–2026 conflict, Wadi Saluki has re‑entered IDF operational planning because it sits inside the broader Nabatieh–Iqlim al‑Tuffah defensive belt, one of Hezbollah’s strongest interior lines.
The IDF now maintains dominance over the Israeli side opposite the Saluki axis, including elevated positions near Misgav Am, Yiftah, and Ramot Naftali, which provide surveillance into the region.
