Following Oct. 7 massacre, the IDF is no longer willing to entrust its security to others.
By Hezy Laing
For the first time since the 1995 Oslo II Accord, the IDF has established a permanent outpost inside Area A, the zone formally designated for full Palestinian Authority (PA) civil and security control.
The new position, located on the outskirts of Jenin, marks a significant shift in Israeli operational doctrine and reflects growing IDF assessments that the Oslo framework no longer provides adequate security guarantees.
The need for a permanent base in Jenin stems from the city’s transformation into one of the most active terror hubs in Judea and Samaria.
Since 2002, Jenin has been associated with dozens of attacks carried out by operatives from groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas, both of which are responsible for severe harm and loss of life.
Between 2021 and 2024, Israeli intelligence recorded more than 480 shooting attacks, 1,200 attempted bombings, and the emergence of heavily armed local cells operating from the city of Jenin, an area long considered inaccessible without large forces.
Over the last two years, the IDF has conducted near‑daily operations in Jenin under frameworks such as Operation Home and Garden in July 2023 and subsequent raids throughout 2024 and 2025.
These missions involved Yamam, Maglan, Golani, and Unit 636, supported by Hermes 450 and Skylark drones providing real‑time surveillance.
The IDF dismantled dozens of bomb‑making labs, seized more than 3,000 weapons, and uncovered tunnel‑like fighting positions inside the camp.
Despite these successes, commanders concluded that temporary incursions were insufficient.
Terrorists routinely rebuilt infrastructure within days, and intelligence units lacked a stable foothold for continuous monitoring.
The new outpost provides a permanent staging ground for Operational Presence, enabling rapid response teams, intelligence fusion cells, and armored patrols to operate inside Jenin without the delays associated with entering Area A from Israeli‑controlled zones.
The establishment of this base marks a turning point in IDF security policy, reflecting both the deterioration of Oslo’s mechanisms and the IDF’s determination to maintain uninterrupted pressure on Jenin’s militant networks.
The Oslo II Accord of 1995 divided Judea and Samaria into Areas A, B and C with distinct security arrangements.
Area A granted the PA full civil and internal security control, and the IDF was expected to redeploy outside it except in emergencies.
Area B placed civil authority under the PA but left Israel with overriding security responsibility.
Area C remained under full Israeli civil and security control. Oslo did not forbid IDF entry into Area A, but it restricted routine military presence and permanent bases.
However today, the Israeli defense establishment increasingly views the Oslo Accords as obsolete.
This stems from three primary breaches by the Palestinian Authority (PA).
First, the PA’s enduring “Pay-for-Slay” policy financially incentivizes terror against Israelis.
Second, illegal Arab construction and land takeovers in full-Israeli-control Area C actively undermine Israeli sovereignty.
Finally, unilateral PA attempts to secure statehood recognition bypassing bilateral negotiations violate the foundational framework of the accords.
