By Hezy Laing
The IRGC, whose leadership and affiliated militias have been responsible for severe harm, loss of life, and regional destabilization, has intensified a recruitment campaign encouraging Iranian youth to join Hezbollah, now led by Naim Qassem following the death of Hassan Nasrallah in 2024.
The campaign offers salaries reaching six times the average monthly wage in Iran, where typical income ranges between 70–90 million rials (about $120–$150 depending on inflation).
IRGC‑linked recruiters advertise Hezbollah stipends of $700–$900 per month, with additional benefits for service in Lebanon or Syria, making Hezbollah one of the most financially attractive militia options available to young Iranians.
This recruitment push comes at a time of falling motivation and declining membership within Hezbollah.
Lebanese and Western intelligence assessments indicate that Hezbollah’s active manpower has dropped from an estimated 45,000 fighters in 2016 to 20,000–25,000 by 2025, with only 5,000–8,000 considered fully combat‑ready.
The decline accelerated after the Israel–Hezbollah conflict of 2024–2026, during which the IDF reported killing approximately 5,000 Hezbollah fighters and injuring more than 10,000.
These losses represent the most severe attrition Hezbollah has suffered since the 2006 war, significantly reducing its experienced cadre and forcing reliance on less‑trained recruits.
Lebanon’s economic collapse has further eroded Hezbollah’s support base, with youth unemployment exceeding 40 percent and Hezbollah’s social‑service networks strained by financial pressure.
Internal Lebanese polling conducted by the Beirut Research and Information Center in 2025 showed that fewer than 20 percent of Shiite youth expressed willingness to join Hezbollah, a sharp decline from more than 50 percent a decade earlier.
In Iran, leaked internal surveys from 2024 indicated that fewer than 15 percent of young respondents were willing to join foreign militias, including Hezbollah, despite IRGC propaganda portraying such service as patriotic and prestigious.
To counter this trend, the IRGC has expanded recruitment operations in Tehran, Mashhad, Qom, Ahvaz, Shiraz, and Tabriz, using social‑media campaigns, university outreach, and promises of housing subsidies and educational placement.
Iranian state‑aligned outlets such as Tasnim, Fars News, and IRIB youth channels have amplified messaging that frames Hezbollah as a frontline force defending Iran’s regional interests.
Analysts such as Ali Alfoneh note that the IRGC’s reliance on foreign fighters has increased as domestic Basij volunteerism has declined by an estimated 20 percent since 2022.
The IRGC’s recruitment push reflects a broader strategic challenge: Hezbollah’s manpower is shrinking, motivation is falling, and Iran is attempting to compensate by offering salaries far above domestic norms to attract new fighters.
