Iran’s Revolutionary Guard would likely push for a forceful reaction to preserve deterrence.
By Hezy Laing
The question of whether Iran would attack Israel in the event of an American strike has become one of the most debated strategic scenarios in the Middle East.
While Iran’s leadership routinely threatens retaliation against both Washington and Jerusalem, the actual likelihood of Tehran launching missiles at Israel is far more complex than its rhetoric suggests.
Much depends on Iran’s strategic calculus, its regional priorities, and the risks it is willing to assume at a moment of crisis.
If the United States were to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, command centers, or Revolutionary Guard assets, Tehran would face enormous pressure—both domestic and ideological—to respond.
Iran has built its regional identity around resistance to American influence, and the Revolutionary Guard would likely push for a forceful reaction to preserve deterrence.
However, responding directly against Israel is not necessarily Iran’s first or safest option.
Iran’s leadership understands that attacking Israel would almost certainly trigger a large‑scale Israeli response, potentially drawing Jerusalem fully into the conflict and expanding the war in ways Tehran may not be prepared to handle.
This is where a crucial viewpoint emerges among analysts: Iran has no interest in giving Israel a pretext to join the fight.
Israel possesses superior airpower, advanced missile‑defense systems, and a long history of striking Iranian assets across the region.
A direct Iranian attack on Israel would open the door to Israeli operations not only in Syria and Lebanon but potentially inside Iran itself.
For Tehran, this is a deeply unattractive scenario.
As a result, it is far from certain that Iran would rush to launch missiles at Israel, even under the shock of an American strike.
Instead, Iran might choose more calibrated forms of retaliation.
It could target U.S. bases in the Gulf, activate proxy militias in Iraq or Yemen, or escalate naval harassment in the Strait of Hormuz.
These actions allow Iran to demonstrate resolve without crossing the threshold that would guarantee Israeli involvement.
Hezbollah, Iran’s most powerful regional proxy, also faces constraints: a full‑scale war with Israel would devastate Lebanon and risk the destruction of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure.
Ultimately, Iran’s decision would hinge on balancing symbolic retaliation with strategic survival.
While the danger of escalation is real, the assumption that Iran would automatically attack Israel is far from guaranteed.
