The Turkish government has repeatedly denied allowing its territory to be used for Hamas operations, but Israeli intelligence assessments presented throughout 2026 emphasized that Turkey had become a “central overseas hub” for Hamas’s organizational, financial, and recruitment activities.
By Hezy Laing
Senior officials in the Shabak (Israel’s Internal Security Agency) and the IDF report that a growing number of Hamas‑directed terror plots targeting Israeli civilians and soldiers were traced back to operatives based in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul.
According to intelligence summaries delivered to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in February and April 2026, at least twenty‑three attack plans uncovered since late 2025 were coordinated by Hamas members who had relocated to Turkey after the October 7 attacks.
These findings built on earlier assessments but marked a significant escalation in the scale and frequency of Turkish‑based command activity.
Shabak interrogations from January through May 2026 revealed that several West Bank cells received encrypted instructions from handlers operating in Istanbul’s Esenyurt and Fatih districts.
Israeli officials identified Zaher Jabarin, long considered Hamas’s financial chief, as a central figure in the renewed Turkish network.
Although Saleh al‑Arouri, the deputy Hamas leader, had been killed in Beirut in January 2024, Shabak analysts stated that his organizational infrastructure in Turkey remained active and had been reconstituted under new leadership by early 2026.
Financial intelligence reports submitted by Shabak Director David Zini in March 2026 described how Hamas operatives in Turkey continued to channel hundreds of thousands of dollars into the West Bank through cryptocurrency transfers, charitable fronts, and business intermediaries.
One 2026 indictment filed in the Jerusalem District Court detailed how a Hamas‑linked courier network moved funds from Istanbul to Hebron via Jordanian intermediaries.
The IDF noted that several attacks during the spring of 2026, including shootings near Ofra, Route 60, and the Tunnel Road, were carried out by cells that had received operational guidance from Turkish‑based commanders.
The Turkish government has repeatedly denied allowing its territory to be used for Hamas operations, but Israeli intelligence assessments presented throughout 2026 emphasized that Turkey had become a “central overseas hub” for Hamas’s organizational, financial, and recruitment activities.
By mid‑2026, Shabak and the IDF concluded that dozens of Hamas attacks over the past decade—and a significant cluster in 2026—originated from networks operating on Turkish soil, underscoring the increasingly international dimension of Israel’s counterterrorism efforts.
