An ambitious plan for a ground invasion from the west was halted three days after the start of the war.

By Hezy Laing

At the end of February 2026, when war broke out between Israel and the United States and Iran, a particularly ambitious plan was on the agenda.

Not just airstrikes on nuclear and missile facilities, but a ground operation designed to undermine the foundations of the Iranian regime from within. But just three days after the fighting began, the order came from Washington: stop.

According to detailed reports published in recent months in the Israeli and international media, the Mossad has prepared a plan to deploy Kurdish forces – from Iran and Iraq – as a ground force that would invade from the northwest, open a front and ignite a broad popular protest.

The plan, which was dubbed in various sources by code names such as “Cat in Boots”, was built over time and was supposed to change the face of the area.

Israel had reportedly armed the Kurdish militias with weapons confiscated from Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, provided training – some even on Israeli soil – and ensured continuous air coverage.

The idea was to create a no-fly zone and provide fire support to allow advance against the Revolutionary Guard forces.

The initial force was estimated at about 15,000 fighters, with the hope that they would be joined by thousands more from the local population and other minorities.

The goal: to break through the barrier of fear, to create chaos that would force the regime to deploy forces, and ultimately lead to collapse or a change of government.

The head of the Mossad at the time, Dedi Barnea, was considered one of the most prominent supporters of the move.

According to sources, he introduced it to the Israeli leadership and to US President Donald Trump even before the outbreak of the war.

Israel saw this as a historic opportunity to take advantage of Iran’s temporary weakness and create conditions that the Iranian people themselves could take advantage of.

In the IDF and Military Intelligence, on the other hand, more skeptical voices were heard. Some assessments spoke of low chances, relative military weakness of the Kurds, and dangers of regional escalation.

On the eve of the war, Barnea presented to the Cabinet the Mossad’s assessment that “the process of overthrowing the regime could take many months, even a year.”

And then came the critical moment.

Three days after the operation began, when the forces were already ready for action and the airstrikes opened corridors, the order came from the White House: “Don’t do.”

Turkish pressure from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has reportedly played a major role.

Ankara feared the reinforcement of Kurdish forces in the region, and a conversation with Trump was enough to stop the move.

Media leaks, internal doubts in the US administration, and risk assessments also contributed to the decision.

The original plan was taken off the agenda.

Israel has presented alternatives – cognitive influence attempts, ties with figures such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and other strategies – but these have not yielded the desired result.

The Iranian regime survived the war, even though it suffered severe damage to its military and nuclear capabilities.

Disputes arose within the Israeli security establishment: the Mossad claimed that the opportunity was missed, while other sources emphasized that such a ground operation in the midst of an active war was too dangerous and had limited chances of success.

Today, with Iran’s economy crumbling under the blows of sanctions and inflation galloping, US President Donald Trump continues to make it clear that he has no timetable to ease the pressure.

“I’m not in a hurry,” he said in an interview with Al Jazeera, “I don’t have any schedule at all.”

This story reveals several layers of the regional reality.

On the one hand, Israel’s ambition and willingness to think outside the box when it comes to the Iranian threat.

On the other hand, the limitations of alliances, the conflicting interests of allies such as Turkey, and the enormous difficulty of overthrowing an established and oppressive regime through external forces and minorities.

The Kurds themselves, with their long history of struggles and discouragement, were ultimately left out of the big picture.

Six months after the start of the war, reports of the plan that was halted continue to be published, sparking debate.

Was it a real missed opportunity, or was it an overly ambitious idea whose chances were slim to begin with?

What is clear is that at the critical moments of the war, the American decision changed the course of events – leaving the question of the future of the regime in Iran open.