Why is Egypt aiming missiles at Haifa?

Cairo, Egypt - 8 September 2025 : SAM 6 USSR missiles elevated 2K12 KUB surface to air defense KY6 missile SA-6 gainful from the Egyptian national military (Shutterstock)

A former IDF intelligence officer warns that Egypt’s growing missile capabilities, expanding military infrastructure and domestic arms industry deserve far greater attention from Israeli security planners.

By Hezy Laing

Why would Egyptian military threats mention Haifa and Dimona, two of Israel’s most important strategic locations?

According to former IDF intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Eli Dekel, Israel should pay closer attention to the military capabilities Egypt is developing, even while the two countries remain formally at peace.

In an interview published November 18, 2026, by Israeli news outlet TOV, Dekel warned that Egypt’s military expansion raises serious questions about Israel’s long-term security assumptions.

The concern is not simply what Egyptian leaders say, but what Egypt is building.

Dekel served for more than 20 years in IDF Military Intelligence, where he headed the terrain analysis branch, examining geographical and infrastructure developments to assess military capabilities.

Through his independent research platform, Dekel Strategic Intelligence, he studies satellite imagery and physical changes on the ground, including roads, bridges, tunnels, airbases and military factories.

He believes Israel must evaluate potential adversaries according to their capabilities, not simply current public statements.

Could Egyptian missiles reach Haifa?

The missile question is particularly striking because Egypt possesses a ballistic missile arsenal that includes several Scud variants.

According to the Arms Control Association’s worldwide missile inventory, Egypt has Scud-B missiles with an estimated range of 300 kilometers, Project-T missiles with a range of approximately 450 kilometers, and Scud-C missiles with an estimated range of 550 kilometers.

These figures describe potential missile reach, not confirmed targeting assignments, and the actual operational condition and deployment of individual systems are not publicly established.

Dekel’s warning follows reports in Egyptian media during the Gaza war that included threats involving long-range missiles and chemical weapons, with Haifa and Dimona as targets.

According to Dekel, Egypt even posted its own propaganda videos on YouTube boasting that its missiles are intended for Dimona (Israel’s nuclear reactor) and Haifa (major port / refineries / navy base)

Building the infrastructure for military power

Dekel’s concerns extend beyond weapons to the infrastructure that could support a large military operation.

He has repeatedly highlighted Egypt’s development of roads, tunnels beneath the Suez Canal, expanded military facilities and airbases in the Sinai Peninsula.

These projects have important economic and civilian purposes, but they also have potential military applications.

The Suez Canal tunnels, for example, provide additional routes for transporting troops, tanks and heavy equipment from mainland Egypt into Sinai.

This matters because moving a large army across the canal would be a major logistical challenge without suitable crossing infrastructure.

An important independent assessment came from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in March 2025.

In a detailed study, former Israeli ambassador to Egypt Amira Oron documented Egypt’s extensive investment in Sinai, including roads, railway projects, tunnels, industrial facilities and other infrastructure.

Oron explained that the developments serve Egypt’s economic and security objectives, while also acknowledging that some permanent infrastructure could have military implications.

The 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty strictly limits military forces in the Sinai Peninsula.

The treaty allows mutually agreed exceptions—which Israel regularly granted between 2012 and 2020 so Egypt could fight ISIS terrorists.

But recently Israeli leadership has formally raised alarms with Washington that Cairo has gone far beyond those temporary counterterrorism permissions without Israeli consent.

Egypt is expanding its ammunition industry

Another concern raised by Dekel is Egypt’s effort to manufacture more of its own military equipment and ammunition.

This development is confirmed by Egyptian government announcements.

In August 2026, Egypt’s Ministry of Military Production announced plans to increase domestic ammunition production and reduce dependence on foreign imports.

The ministry specifically identified modernization of production lines, greater manufacturing capacity and the development of domestic technologies as priorities.

Egypt’s Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries, also known as Factory 81, is already an established military manufacturer.

According to Egypt’s Ministry of Military Production, its products include heavy ammunition, mortar bombs, detonating cords and protective equipment.

In October 2026, the ministry also highlighted further modernization and technological development at the facility.

Domestic ammunition production gives Egypt greater ability to maintain supplies during a prolonged military crisis without depending entirely on foreign deliveries.

This is a significant expansion of Egypt’s defense-industrial capabilities.

A troubling chapter in Egypt’s military history

Dekel also warns also about Egypt’s historical use of chemical weapons.

During the North Yemen Civil War between 1963 and 1967, Egyptian forces were accused of using chemical agents against royalist fighters.

Research published in 2026 in the journal International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence examines the historical evidence and concludes that Egyptian chemical weapons use occurred, although questions remain about the precise agents and quantities involved.

Egypt has always denied the allegations.

Egypt has also never signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, the international agreement prohibiting the development, production and use of chemical weapons.

The lesson Israel must take seriously

Dekel’s argument reflects a wider strategic concern that became particularly relevant after October 7: military capabilities must never be assessed solely through the lens of present-day political relationships.

Iran was once a close Israeli partner before the 1979 revolution, while Turkey maintained extensive military cooperation with Israel before relations deteriorated.

Egypt is not currently at war with Israel, but roads, tunnels, factories, missiles and military facilities are long-term assets that can remain in place long after political circumstances change.

For Israel, the challenge is to preserve the peace treaty while maintaining a clear-eyed understanding of the military capabilities developing across its southern border.

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