A combined operation would begin with a massive effort to neutralize Iran’s air‑defense network. Establishing air superiority is considered essential before deeper strikes can begin.
By Hezy Laing
The collapse of the Geneva negotiations has sharply increased assessments that a joint U.S.–Israeli air attack on Iran is no longer a distant contingency but a realistic scenario under active consideration.
With diplomacy stalled and Tehran continuing to expand its missile capabilities and regional operations, both Washington and Jerusalem now view coordinated military action as a credible option should Iran escalate further.
Analysts note that the failure in Geneva removed the last meaningful diplomatic buffer, raising the likelihood that long‑prepared joint strike plans could be activated.
While neither Washington nor Jerusalem has announced such an operation, both militaries have spent years preparing coordinated plans, and recent escalations have increased the probability that these contingencies could shift from planning rooms to execution.
A combined operation would begin with a massive effort to neutralize Iran’s air‑defense network. Establishing air superiority is considered essential before deeper strikes can begin.
The United States, with its stealth aircraft and long‑range bombers, would likely spearhead the dismantling of radar arrays, surface‑to‑air missile batteries, and command‑and‑control hubs across the country.
Israel would simultaneously target long‑range ballistic‑missile infrastructure capable of reaching its cities within minutes. The objective is to carve out a secure aerial corridor for repeated waves of bombers and strike aircraft.
Once air defenses are degraded, the operation would shift to Iran’s missile forces.
Israel is expected to focus on long‑range systems such as the Shahab and Sejjil families, while the United States would concentrate on medium‑ and short‑range missiles that threaten American bases in the Persian Gulf and regional partners.
A joint strike would also target the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps naval fleet to prevent any attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz.
American bunker‑buster munitions could be used against Iran’s underground “missile cities,” which house launch systems deep beneath reinforced layers of earth and concrete.
While nuclear sites at Natanz and Fordow remain strategically important, analysts suggest they are not the immediate priority in the opening phase.
Some assessments extend beyond military objectives, arguing that weakening Iran’s leadership structure could destabilize the regime’s ability to respond.
A leadership vacuum, they argue, would hinder the government’s capacity to suppress domestic unrest once its military infrastructure is damaged.
Any such operation would be accompanied by a broad defensive coalition, with European and regional partners contributing to missile‑interception efforts.
A critical factor shaping Israeli planning is Iran’s structural vulnerabilities.
Despite possessing an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 ballistic missiles, Iran reportedly operates fewer than 100 active launchers, creating a bottleneck in its ability to fire large salvos.
Many missiles rely on liquid fuel, leaving them exposed during lengthy fueling procedures that are vulnerable to pre‑emptive strikes.
In anticipation of a potential American‑Israeli operation, Iran has begun concentrating its remaining air‑defense systems around Tehran and other essential facilities, attempting to shield its most valuable assets from the opening wave of attacks.
