For years, Iran has relied on proxies to wage a multi‑front war against Israel. Who says Israel can’t use similar methods against Iran?
By Hezy Laing
For years, Iran has relied on proxies to wage a multi‑front war against Israel.
These include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
By using these groups, Tehran gains plausible deniability while projecting power, launching rockets, drones, and terror attacks against Israeli targets.
Outsourcing conflict allows Iran to avoid direct confrontation, destabilize Israel’s borders, and maintain constant pressure through asymmetric warfare.
Israel’s traditional strategy has been to degrade Iran’s proxies rather than to cultivate its own.
Yet there is no inherent reason Israel could not adopt similar methods against Iran.
Shiite‑dominated Iran faces significant enemies both within and outside its borders, and these groups could theoretically be supported to undermine Tehran’s stability.
The ethnic and separatist movements most often cited as potential anti‑Iranian actors are Iranian Kurds, Baluchis, and Ahvazi Arabs.
Each has a history of armed resistance against the regime.
Iranian Kurds (Northwest Iran, bordering Iraq and Turkey): Multiple Kurdish parties such as KDPI, Komala, and PJAK have fought the regime for decades.
They maintain armed camps in Iraqi Kurdistan and could harass Iranian forces in the northwest.
Their symbolic value lies in their long‑standing opposition, though fragmented leadership and fear of crackdowns limit their effectiveness.
Kurdish resistance groups even called for an uprising during the recent Israel–Iran conflict.
Baluchis (Southeastern Iran, Sistan‑Baluchistan): This Sunni minority faces systemic discrimination.
Groups like Jaish al‑Adl regularly conduct attacks on the IRGC and police.
Their insurgency is already active and could destabilize Iran’s southeast.
Israel might covertly encourage them, but their Islamist orientation makes them unpredictable allies.
Ahvazi Arabs (Southwest Iran, Khuzestan): This Arab minority lives in Iran’s oil‑rich region.
Organizations such as the Ahvaz National Resistance have staged attacks in the past.
They could threaten Iran’s energy infrastructure, but they are heavily repressed and limited in numbers.
Beyond internal groups, Iran also faces hostility from several neighboring states.
The countries most antagonistic toward Tehran are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan.
Iran shares borders with Iraq, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, but relations vary: some neighbors are pragmatic partners, while others are rivals due to sectarian divides, geopolitical competition, or security disputes.
Tensions with Pakistan and Afghanistan are particularly notable, as both have had periodic clashes with Iran over border security and militant activity.
Bahrain (maritime neighbor): Hostile toward Iran, accusing it of backing Shia opposition movements.
Bahrain hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet and aligns closely with Saudi Arabia and Western powers.
Azerbaijan (land border): Relations are increasingly tense.
Azerbaijan maintains close ties with Israel through arms purchases and intelligence cooperation, while disputes over Iran’s support for Armenia and occasional border friction add to the strain.
Saudi Arabia (maritime neighbor via the Persian Gulf): A long‑standing rival due to the Sunni–Shia divide, proxy wars in Yemen and Syria, and competition for regional leadership. Relations thawed slightly after the 2023 China‑brokered deal, but the rivalry persists.
Iran wages war on Israel through proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shiite militias, avoiding direct confrontation while destabilizing borders.
Israel traditionally counters these groups but could exploit Iran’s internal vulnerabilities.
Kurdish, Baluchi, and Ahvazi Arab separatists, alongside hostile neighbors like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan, represent potential pressure points.
