Israel on the cusp of finishing the war that Hamas started
The simple, if unpalatable truth is that Israel has failed to replicate its success in Gaza because of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas.
The simple, if unpalatable truth is that Israel has failed to replicate its success in Gaza because of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas.
IDF forces eliminated dozens of terrorists, took out key infrastructure, uncovered and destroyed a 2-kilometer strategic tunnel, and seized a trove of Hamas weapons—including rockets, IEDs, launchers, and grenades.
Mental health care has also expanded significantly since the war began, with over 1,000 mental health officers deployed, more than 80 field missions conducted inside Gaza and Lebanon to offer direct support to combat troops.
This attack follows a series of Houthi missile and drone attacks in recent weeks, including a ballistic missile strike near Ben-Gurion International Airport on May 4 that wounded eight civilians and disrupted air traffic.
In a targeted strike, the IDF eliminated a Hezbollah terrorist who was restoring a previously attacked command site on Beaufort Ridge in southeast Lebanon.
Edan Alexander, an IDF soldier stationed at the Nirim base in southern Israel, was kidnapped by Hamas during the October 7th massacre and held underground in Gaza for 584 harrowing days before his release last night.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly targeted Mohammed Sinwar, brother of Yahya Sinwar—the mastermind behind the October 7th massacre—in a strike on his bunker located beneath the European Hospital in Khan Younis.
More broadly, in the coming months, the IDF’s strategic focus centers on the Gaza Strip and countering threats from Iran, while preserving and building on security achievements attained across various fronts.
Reports from Gaza identified the second fatality in the strike in Khan Yunis as Ahmad al-Qudra, a colonel in Hamas’ internal security apparatus.
PTSD is not limited to soldiers, says a Ben-Gurion University study released in March that found that nearly half of young Israelis showed symptoms of war-related PTSD.
The military has called up 60,000 reservists in recent days, who will presumably take part in the operation.
It was expected that modern technology would allow Israel to rely solely on counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism capabilities, leading the IDF to mistakenly downgrade its ground forces.
Israel’s success included decapitation of its senior echelon, destruction and capture of vast numbers of weapons, and killing thousands of terrorists.
The decision not to brace for a possible assault was made by ‘wide consensus’ across the Military Intelligence Directorate and the broader army.
The formation of a completely new, eastern IDF division that will guard Israel’s longest land border is also in the works.
The equipment procured includes armored vehicles, munitions, ammunition, personal protection gear, and medical equipment.
The considerable Egyptian military presence in the Sinai Peninsula and ongoing infrastructure work has some observers in Israel alarmed.
The alerts began when IDF intelligence noticed dozens to hundreds of Israeli SIM cellphone cards switching on within Gaza, which was an indication of a potential invasion.
IDF intelligence unit obtained 40-page plan detailing plan for October 7th terror onslaught, but did not share it with Netanyahu or the military’s top brass.
The army ignored Shabak warnings that recent Iranian-supplied bombs can destroy the armored vehicles used nightly in anti-terror raids.
