The findings raise difficult questions about how such extensive preparations went undetected by the Israeli intelligence.
By Hezy Laing
New reporting indicates that Hamas began laying the foundations for the October 7, 2023 attack nearly a decade before it occurred, dramatically expanding the timeline of preparation behind the massacre.
According to sources familiar with internal assessments, the organization initiated conceptual planning as early as 2014, in the aftermath of the Gaza war that year.
Although operational activity paused for a period following that conflict, the long‑term strategic intent appears to have remained intact.
Investigators now believe that Hamas resumed structured training and operational development in 2021, using the relative quiet of the intervening years to refine tactics, build specialized units, and study Israeli border defenses.
Portions of captured Hamas operational documents, later summarized by Israeli investigators, echoed this long‑term approach.
One directive instructed commanders to “prepare for a day when the borders will open by force,” while another emphasized the need to “maintain silence and avoid any action that may reveal the intention.”
This extended timeline challenges earlier assumptions that the attack was conceived only a few years before it was carried out.
Instead, the emerging picture suggests a methodical, multi‑year effort designed to exploit Israeli perceptions of deterrence and stability.
One of the most striking findings is the degree of secrecy maintained within Hamas’s leadership.
Only a handful of senior figures were reportedly aware of the full scope of the plan, a level of compartmentalization that helped the organization evade detection by Israeli intelligence.
This tight control over information is now seen as a major factor in the intelligence failures that preceded the attack, allowing Hamas to mask its intentions behind a façade of political pragmatism and economic engagement.
An internal Israeli military review concluded that the preparations for the assault spanned at least seven years, pointing to a pattern of deception and misdirection that systematically misled analysts.
The report suggests that Hamas invested heavily in studying Israeli surveillance systems, rehearsing infiltration routes, and developing communications discipline that minimized electronic signatures.
The new timeline has significant strategic implications.
It indicates that Hamas was committed to a large‑scale cross‑border attack long before regional analysts believed, and that the organization’s leadership pursued this objective with patience and long‑term planning.
The findings also raise difficult questions about how such extensive preparations went undetected and how deeply Israel’s assumptions about Hamas’s intentions shaped its intelligence posture in the years leading up to the attack.
