Iran’s internal opposition includes groups such as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), Kurdish militias like the PJAK, and underground protest cells that emerged during the 2019–2020 gasoline protests and the 2022 Mahsa Amini uprising, which involved demonstrations in more than 160 cities.
By Hezy Laing
Recently, leading American conservative commentator Mark Levin, a longtime supporter of President Trump, publicly urged the administration to reconsider its caution regarding support for anti‑regime Iranian groups.
Levin’s remarks came during a nationally broadcast segment on Westwood One and were later amplified through his social‑media accounts, where he has more than 3 million followers.
Citing escalating regional tensions following Iran’s July 28 IRGC missile attack on U.S. positions in Jordan, Levin argued that empowering Iranian dissidents could weaken the Islamic Republic’s capacity to project force across the Middle East.
Levin referenced reports from The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post documenting the Trump administration’s internal debate over covert assistance to Iranian opposition networks.
According to a July 2026 WSJ article, senior officials expressed concern that direct U.S. involvement could trigger retaliation against American forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.
Levin countered that Israel, which has a long history of clandestine operations inside Iran, including the 2020 assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and multiple Mossad‑linked sabotage incidents at Natanz and Isfahan, could serve as a proxy for such efforts.
“If you fear the consequences of arming anti‑regime Iranians,” Levin said, “let the Israelis do it,” a statement later quoted by Newsweek and The Jerusalem Post.
Levin pointed to Israel’s demonstrated willingness to confront Iran directly, citing the April 14, 2024 Iranian missile barrage and Israel’s subsequent Arrow‑3 exo‑atmospheric interceptions, confirmed by the Israel Defense Forces and U.S. Central Command.
He also referenced Israel’s covert support for Kurdish groups in the 1960s and 1970s, documented in the work of historian Ofra Bengio, as precedent for Israeli involvement in regional insurgencies.
Levin argued that Israeli intelligence networks, including Mossad’s Kidon and Caesarea units, possess the operational reach needed to supply Iranian dissidents without exposing U.S. personnel to direct retaliation.
His comments sparked debate among foreign‑policy analysts. Scholars such as Michael Doran of the Hudson Institute and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations noted that Israel has historically acted against Iran when it perceives existential threats, while others warned that overt coordination could escalate regional conflict.
Levin’s intervention highlighted growing pressure on Washington to adopt a more aggressive posture toward Tehran amid rising instability across the Middle East.
Arming anti‑regime Iranians could weaken the Islamic Republic by empowering networks already active inside the country.
Iran’s internal opposition includes groups such as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), Kurdish militias like the PJAK, and underground protest cells that emerged during the 2019–2020 gasoline protests and the 2022 Mahsa Amini uprising, which involved demonstrations in more than 160 cities.
Providing these groups with communications gear, funding, or defensive weapons could strain the regime’s security forces, which number roughly 125,000 IRGC personnel and 60,000 Basij militia, forcing them to disperse across multiple fronts.
Analysts such as Ray Takeyh and Michael Doran argue that sustained internal pressure, combined with Iran’s economic crisis—marked by inflation exceeding 40% and a currency that has lost over 90% of its value since 2018—could erode the regime’s ability to maintain control.
Washington has showed signs of hesitation over an Israeli proposal to covertly arm Kurdish factions opposed to Tehran, reflecting growing U.S. concern about escalation with Iran.
According to reporting from The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, senior officials fear that supplying Kurdish groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) or PJAK could trigger Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces stationed in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, where roughly 2,500 American troops remain deployed.
Israeli officials have argued that empowering Kurdish fighters—who have clashed with Iranian security forces in West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, and Kurdistan provinces—could strain the Islamic Republic’s internal stability at a moment when Iran faces inflation above 40%, a currency collapse exceeding 90% since 2018, and recurring protests in cities like Sanandaj, Mahabad, and Saqqez.





























