Without reliable digital communication, coordination becomes slower and more compartmentalized.
By Hezy Laing
In recent years, terror groups targeting Israel have increasingly turned to low‑tech communication tools in an effort to evade the country’s formidable intelligence services.
Smartphones, encrypted apps, and digital networks—once considered essential—became liabilities as Israel’s cyber and signals‑intelligence capabilities exposed, tracked, and dismantled entire operational cells.
The shift to analog tools was meant to close those vulnerabilities. Instead, it opened new ones.
Hezbollah was the most dramatic example.
After years of suffering losses from smartphone tracking, the group adopted pagers and walkie‑talkies as its primary communication devices.
These were chosen precisely because they lacked internet connectivity and produced minimal digital signatures.
Yet Israeli intelligence reportedly infiltrated the supply chain, modifying thousands of devices.
When the pagers detonated in a coordinated blast, the operation demonstrated not only technical sophistication but also deep human‑intelligence penetration.
Hamas has long attempted similar low‑tech strategies.
Commanders have relied on couriers, handwritten notes, wired field telephones, and short‑range radios to avoid interception.
But Israel repeatedly adapted. In multiple operations, Israeli intelligence mapped courier routes, intercepted paper messages, and used aerial surveillance to track movement patterns.
In other cases, Israel exploited the very analog devices militants believed were safe, using direction‑finding equipment to locate radio operators and strike command centers.
Beyond Gaza and Lebanon, Iran‑backed militias in Syria and Iraq have also tried to avoid digital exposure by banning smartphones, using offline laptops, and conducting face‑to‑face briefings.
Yet Israeli airstrikes have repeatedly targeted weapons convoys, command posts, and training sites—evidence that low‑tech communication alone cannot conceal broader operational footprints.
This shift to low‑tech tools has also reshaped how these groups plan and execute operations.
Without reliable digital communication, coordination becomes slower and more compartmentalized.
Commanders must rely on couriers or brief in person, which limits the speed at which orders can move across units and increases the risk of delays or misunderstandings.
Real‑time intelligence sharing becomes difficult, reducing their ability to adapt quickly during clashes or respond to Israeli movements.
The need to avoid electronic signatures also forces fighters to operate in smaller, more isolated cells, which can hinder large‑scale planning and reduce operational flexibility.
While these methods offer some protection from digital surveillance, they impose significant logistical burdens that ultimately constrain the groups’ ability to maneuver, communicate, and sustain prolonged engagements.
Israel’s intelligence community has also excelled at prevention, disrupting plots before they mature.
Over the years, Israeli agencies have intercepted smuggling networks, exposed covert financial channels, and foiled attempts to move advanced weapons into Gaza and Lebanon.
In many cases, these successes stemmed from blending high‑tech surveillance with old‑fashioned human intelligence.
The ongoing contest between militant groups seeking invisibility and Israeli agencies determined to expose them has become a defining feature of the region’s security landscape.
Each shift to low‑tech methods is met with an unexpected countermove, underscoring a simple reality: in this shadow war, no tool—digital or analog—is ever truly safe.
