Despite the heavy damage inflicted during the 2025 strikes, intelligence assessments suggest Iran’s program remains functional.
By Hezy Laing
Military analysts increasingly argue that Israel would be highly likely to join the United States in any renewed military action against Iran, particularly if events threaten Israel’s core security interests or suggest an imminent danger to its survival.
This assessment is shaped not only by long‑standing strategic concerns but also by recent precedent.
In June 2025, Israel launched a major preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear sites in an operation known as Operation Rising Lion.
The United States followed with its own strikes days later, reinforcing the perception that coordinated action between the two countries is both plausible and strategically aligned.
Experts note that Israel has long viewed Iran’s military and technological ambitions as a direct threat.
A nuclear‑capable Iran is considered by Israeli leaders to be an existential danger, and any American effort to degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would naturally align with Israel’s highest national priorities.
While Israel possesses significant military capabilities of its own, analysts point out that some of Iran’s most fortified facilities—such as the deeply buried Fordow enrichment plant—may be beyond Israel’s ability to destroy without American support.
U.S. participation brings specialized munitions, expanded reach, and a level of sustained pressure that Israel alone may not be able to apply.
Strategic alignment with Washington also plays a central role.
Israel has historically encouraged the United States to adopt a firmer posture toward Iran, especially during periods when American administrations appear more open to military options.
Analysts suggest that Israel sees such moments as rare windows of opportunity to address long‑standing threats.
These windows may widen when Iran faces internal instability or when its regional proxies appear weakened, creating conditions that Israel believes can be exploited to advance its security objectives.
If Israel were to join a new U.S. operation, experts expect the targets to be highly strategic.
Nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan would likely be prioritized, along with missile production sites, storage depots, and launch platforms that support Iran’s extensive ballistic arsenal.
Command centers belonging to the Revolutionary Guard could also be targeted to disrupt Iran’s ability to coordinate a response.
Iranian officials have warned that Israeli territory and U.S. bases would be considered legitimate targets in such a conflict, underscoring the regional stakes.
Despite the heavy damage inflicted during the 2025 strikes, intelligence assessments from late 2025 and early 2026 suggest Iran’s program remains functional.
Tehran claims its nuclear activities are intact and has moved to rebuild damaged sites.
Some enriched material may have been relocated before the attacks, complicating international monitoring.
New construction at previously destroyed research facilities indicates continued determination, while Iran’s expulsion of IAEA inspectors has left the true state of its program uncertain.
