Iran’s current crisis bears striking resemblance to several historical regime collapses.
Hezy Laing
Iran’s current crisis bears striking resemblance to several historical regime collapses, sharing the familiar pattern of economic breakdown, nationwide unrest, and a deep erosion of political legitimacy.
Yet one crucial difference sets Iran apart from many past examples: its security apparatus, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, remains far more unified and loyal than the military forces that fractured in other collapsing states.
This distinction shapes both the trajectory of the unrest and the likelihood of sudden political change.
Recent reporting highlights the scale of Iran’s instability, with protests erupting across all 31 provinces, a currency in freefall, and analysts describing the situation as the most serious internal threat the Islamic Republic has faced since 1979.
Economically, Iran’s situation mirrors the late‑stage crises that preceded the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Romania in 1989, and the prolonged breakdown in Venezuela.
Hyperinflation, a collapsing currency, and widespread shortages have triggered demonstrations in more than 300 locations across over 100 cities.
Merchants, students, workers, and ethnic minorities have all joined the unrest, creating a broad social coalition similar to those seen in Eastern Europe during the final days of communist rule.
The difference, however, lies in the Iranian state’s ability to maintain functioning coercive institutions, something the Soviet and Romanian governments had already lost by the time their systems unraveled.
The nationwide spread of protests also echoes the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as the mass mobilization that toppled Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 2000.
In Iran, demonstrations have persisted despite dozens of deaths and thousands of arrests, and chants openly targeting the Supreme Leader suggest a level of political defiance not seen in decades.
Historically, such broad geographic participation has been a strong predictor of regime collapse.
Yet unlike Egypt in 2011, where the military refused to fire on civilians, Iran’s armed forces are not neutral actors—they are the backbone of the regime itself.
This final point is the most consequential. The IRGC and Basij remain cohesive, heavily armed, and ideologically committed.
They have shown no signs of elite defection, even as unrest intensifies.
Their willingness to use lethal force—evident in the dozens of protesters killed within days—creates a barrier that has prevented the kind of rapid political unraveling seen in 1979 Iran, the Soviet Union, or Egypt.
As long as the security forces remain unified, the regime retains a critical pillar of survival, even as every other structural indicator points toward deepening instability.
