Israel’s air strategy is being reshaped by a new economic reality in warfare: cheap unmanned systems can perform missions once reserved for aircraft costing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, but they still cannot replace the unique capabilities of advanced fighter jets.
By Hezy Laing
Israel is spending tens of billions of shekels on advanced fighter jets at the same time that inexpensive drones are transforming the battlefield, raising a difficult question inside the country’s security establishment: can Israel continue to justify sending million-dollar aircraft against threats that may cost only thousands?
The debate has intensified as drones have become cheaper, more numerous and increasingly capable.
During recent fighting, unmanned aircraft have taken on a growing share of Israel’s air operations, performing intelligence, surveillance, targeting and strike missions while remaining in the air for long periods without putting pilots at risk.
That has led some Israeli defense experts to question whether a highly expensive fighter is the right tool for every aerial mission.
The economic problem is particularly sharp when fighters or expensive air-to-air missiles are used against low-cost drones.
Some Israeli defense experts argue that using an F-35 or a missile costing millions of dollars to destroy a drone costing tens of thousands of shekels is difficult to justify economically.
The alternative is not necessarily to abandon fighter jets, but to build a layered force in which each threat is matched with the cheapest effective weapon.
Israel is already moving in that direction, developing systems ranging from electronic warfare and ground-based interceptors to high-powered lasers designed to destroy drones at much lower cost per engagement.
Israel’s defense establishment itself has emphasized that different threats require different responses, with ground-based systems offering particular advantages against drones because of their availability, endurance and lower interception costs.
Yet the strongest evidence against declaring fighter jets obsolete is Israel’s continued investment in them.
In March 2026, Israel approved the purchase of a fourth F-35 squadron and a second F-15IA squadron as part of a $115 billion, decade-long defense buildup.
The reason is that drones cannot yet replace everything fighters do.
F-35s provide stealth, speed, long-range strike capability and the ability to penetrate heavily defended airspace, while advanced fighters remain central to achieving and maintaining air superiority.
The emerging Israeli debate, therefore, is not really about fighters versus drones.
It is about whether Israel should continue building a force centered on a small number of extremely expensive aircraft—or create a larger, more diverse force in which expensive fighters handle missions only they can perform, while inexpensive unmanned systems handle everything else.
The future Israeli air force may ultimately depend on having both.
