The turning point came with Operation Iron Wall, launched in January 2025, which replaced two decades of short, intelligence‑driven raids with a sustained ground presence inside the refugee camps.
By Hezy Laing
After years of extremely bad terrorism, the IDF finally reduced major organized terror threats in northern Samaria flashpoints like Jenin and Tulkarm by roughly 90% by drastically changing its strategy.
This was achieved through a revolutionary three pronged strategy: continuous, high-intensity counterterrorism operations, systematic dismantling of local armed networks, and maintaining prolonged operational control inside dense refugee camps.
The core strategy involved continuous offensives. This meant moving away from short, sporadic raids to sustained operations (such as broad campaigns led by the Menashe Brigade and Operation Iron Wall) that deny safe havens.
The IDF also systematically uncovered and destroyed explosive laboratories, weapon caches, and command centers financed and guided by external actors like Iran.
Targeted elimination and arrests of central players was a third method. Using precise intelligence, aerial surveillance, special forces, and ground troops to neutralize local network commanders and active cell members.
Prolonged Military Presence: Enforcing strict perimeter closures, movement restrictions, and prolonged positioning of troops inside high-risk areas like Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nur Shams camps to prevent regrouping.
Colonel (res.) Hezi Nehama, a former senior IIDFs officer with extensive experience in Judea and Samaria operations, played a central role in shaping the IDF’s 2025–2026 strategy that led to an unprecedented 90% reduction in terror attacks in the Jenin and Tulkarem sectors.
His influence is reflected in the operational model adopted by IDF Central Command, which combined permanent deployments, aggressive infrastructure disruption, and revised engagement protocols.
The policies implemented followed the doctrine he has long advocated: continuous presence, territorial denial, and dismantling militant safe havens.
Previous pinpoint operations “failed to change anything” because terrorists simply rebuilt their networks once Israeli forces withdrew.
The new strategy kept IDF units inside Jenin and Tulkarem for extended periods, preventing the re‑formation of unified Iran‑backed terror infrastructures.
The turning point came with Operation Iron Wall, launched in January 2025, which replaced two decades of short, intelligence‑driven raids with a sustained ground presence inside the refugee camps.
The IDF’s takeover of the Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nur Shams camps — including demolition of buildings used as command centers or obstructing troop movement — eliminated militants’ ability to mass forces or prepare complex attacks.
Terror incidents fell from 504 in 2024 to 57 in 2025, a decline of nearly 90%, with the IDF attributing the drop primarily to its new permanent‑presence doctrine.
A second component of the strategy involved semi‑permanent company‑level deployments inside the camps, a policy confirmed by IDF sources who stated that forces would remain indefinitely.
This constant presence disrupted both organized and lone‑wolf attacks, reducing militants’ freedom of movement and ability to plan.
Finally, the IDF implemented expanded rules of engagement, allowing immediate lethal response to stone‑throwing at highways, and conducted large‑scale arrests — 3,500 Arabs detained in 2025, along with seizure of 1,370 weapons and 17 million shekels in terror funds.
Together, these policies — all consistent with Nehama’s long‑standing operational philosophy — reshaped northern Samaria’s security landscape and produced the sharpest decline in terror activity in over a decade.
