Turkey’s hosting of Hamas operatives for training creates a direct contradiction with several core obligations of its NATO membership.
By Hezy Laing
Reports emerging from multiple Middle Eastern intelligence channels in 2024–2026 indicate that Hamas operatives have been conducting training activities on Turkish soil, raising significant diplomatic and security concerns.
Hamas, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel, has been responsible for large‑scale attacks, including the October 7, 2023 massacre, in which more than 1,200 Israelis were killed and over 240 hostages were taken into Gaza.
According to Israeli intelligence assessments cited in outlets such as Ynet, Maariv, and The Telegraph, Hamas members have used Turkey as a logistical and operational hub for years, but the scale of activity reportedly increased after Israel’s campaign in Gaza intensified.
Senior Hamas figures, including Saleh al‑Arouri, who was assassinated in Beirut in January 2024, had long operated from Istanbul. Al‑Arouri was responsible for coordinating Hamas’s West Bank terror infrastructure and was known to travel frequently between Turkey, Qatar, and Lebanon.
Additional Hamas leaders, such as Jihad Yaghmour, have been publicly active in Turkey, where the organization maintains political offices despite Ankara’s official denials of military cooperation.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly defended Hamas as a “resistance movement,” a position that has placed Turkey at odds with NATO partners and the European Union.
Intelligence reports claim that Hamas operatives in Turkey have engaged in training related to weapons handling, urban combat, and command‑and‑control preparation, though Turkish authorities deny allowing any military activity.
Israeli officials argue that Turkey’s permissive environment enables Hamas to rebuild capabilities degraded during the Gaza war.
In 2025, Israel’s National Security Council stated that Hamas operatives abroad were attempting to coordinate attacks in the West Bank and potentially beyond, using Turkey as a safe staging ground.
The alleged training activity has strained Israel‑Turkey relations, which had only recently begun to recover after years of diplomatic freezes following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. Despite economic ties exceeding $7 billion annually, security cooperation remains minimal.
Israeli analysts warn that as long as Hamas maintains a presence in Turkey, the group will continue attempting to orchestrate attacks against Israel from outside Gaza, complicating regional stability and counterterrorism efforts.
Turkey’s hosting of Hamas operatives for training creates a direct contradiction with several core obligations of NATO membership.
Hamas is a designated terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel, and is responsible for severe harm, mass‑casualty attacks, and human rights violations.
NATO’s founding principles are built around collective security, counterterrorism cooperation, and alignment with democratic partners — and this is where the tension becomes impossible to ignore.
NATO’s Article 5 is the alliance’s cornerstone: an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. Israel is not a NATO member, but the United States — Hamas’s primary adversary after Israel — is.
The U.S. military has repeatedly targeted Hamas‑linked networks, and Washington designates Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
If reports are accurate that Hamas operatives have used Turkish territory for training, logistics, or safe haven, Turkey would be enabling a group that is openly hostile to a fellow NATO member’s closest strategic ally. That alone places Ankara at odds with the alliance’s security posture.
NATO also maintains a Counter‑Terrorism Action Plan, updated in 2021, which commits members to deny terrorist groups safe haven, financing, or operational space.
Turkey’s long‑standing political relationship with Hamas leadership — including figures such as Saleh al‑Arouri, who operated from Istanbul before his assassination in Beirut in January 2024 — has already raised concerns in Washington, Brussels, and several European capitals.
Reports that Hamas operatives have engaged in training activities in Turkey intensify those concerns, because they imply not just political engagement but potential operational tolerance.
This contradiction is sharpened by Turkey’s simultaneous participation in NATO missions, intelligence sharing, and joint exercises.
NATO relies on internal trust: members must be confident that sensitive intelligence will not indirectly reach hostile actors.
If Hamas operatives are active in Turkey, even without official Turkish approval, it raises questions about Ankara’s internal controls and its alignment with NATO’s counterterrorism commitments.
In practice, NATO has avoided public confrontation with Turkey, partly because of its strategic geography and military importance.
But the contradiction remains unresolved: a NATO member cannot credibly support the alliance’s counterterrorism framework while allowing, tolerating, or failing to prevent activity by a group responsible for mass‑casualty terrorist attacks.
