Egypt now fields more than 1,100 modern tanks, over 300 advanced fighter jets, and a rapidly expanding navy.
By Hezy Laing
Egypt’s accelerating arms buildup has become one of the most consequential and least openly discussed developments in the region, and the scale of Cairo’s acquisitions increasingly raises questions that cannot be explained by domestic defense needs alone.
Egypt now fields more than 1,100 modern tanks, over 300 advanced fighter jets, and a rapidly expanding navy that includes two French‑built Mistral‑class helicopter carriers, German submarines, and a growing fleet of modern frigates.
These platforms are designed for high‑intensity, state‑on‑state warfare, not for counterinsurgency operations against militants in Sinai.
Shai Feldman, one of Israel’s most respected security analysts, has warned that “Egypt’s procurement patterns make little sense if viewed through the lens of counterterrorism. They make far more sense if the goal is to restore a conventional deterrent vis‑à‑vis Israel.”
Feldman stresses that while the peace treaty remains intact, Israel cannot ignore the long‑term implications of Egypt’s rapidly modernizing force.
Efraim Inbar, president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, argues that Egypt’s acquisitions are “far beyond what is required for internal stability or border defense. Heavy armor, long‑range strike aircraft, and naval power projection platforms are not counterterror tools. They are the building blocks of a regional military capable of confronting Israel.”
Inbar notes that Egypt’s purchases are funded largely by foreign aid and Gulf support, allowing Cairo to build a force structure that would otherwise be economically impossible.
Former Israeli National Security Council official Eran Lerman adds that the danger lies not in Egypt’s intentions today but in the capabilities it is amassing for tomorrow.
“Governments can change overnight,” he explains, “but armies are built over decades. A future Egyptian leadership could inherit a military designed for a very different strategic purpose.”
Lerman warns that Israel’s long‑held qualitative military edge is under pressure as Egypt acquires advanced Western and Russian systems at a pace unmatched in the region.
The danger to Israel is not an imminent war but the creation of a military balance that could tempt a future Egyptian regime to challenge the status quo.
A heavily armed Egypt introduces a level of strategic uncertainty unseen since the 1970s, and for Israel, maintaining deterrence and readiness is essential to ensuring that peace remains a durable reality rather than a fragile assumption.
