Some 3,000 terrorists were fully equipped and positioned to cross into Israel.
By Hezy Laing
The threat of a massive terrorist invasion from Israel’s northern border on October 7 was far more severe than initially understood.
According to senior officers and investigators familiar with the events, approximately 3,000 terrorists—2,400 from Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and another 600 from Islamic Jihad—were fully equipped and positioned to cross into Israel.
A second wave of more than 5,000 additional Hezbollah fighters was prepared to follow.
This force was positioned along a border twice the length of Gaza’s, with dense terrain and weapons stockpiles located only meters from Israeli communities.
Brigadier General (res.) Yuval Bezeq, who rushed north that morning even as his son was fighting and later killed in the south, told YNET that the potential outcome could have been catastrophic.
What prevented the northern scenario from unfolding was a decision made outside Lebanon.
While Hamas launched its attack without coordination, Hezbollah did not immediately activate its invasion plan.
Israeli officials later acknowledged that for many hours on October 7, the political‑security cabinet did not know whether Hezbollah intended to join the assault, prompting the diversion of significant forces to the north.
In the aftermath, the scale of Hezbollah’s preparations became unmistakable.
When the IDF maneuvered into southern Lebanon, soldiers uncovered extensive infrastructure: fortified positions, tunnels, and weapons caches hidden in civilian buildings, including pharmacies.
More than 85,000 weapons and munitions were seized, and officers emphasized that this represented only a fraction of what had been stored along the border.
IDF units continue to uncover additional stockpiles even now.
Despite the magnitude of the threat, the northern front has received far less public scrutiny than the failures in the south.
Over 68,000 residents were evacuated from northern communities, many for more than a year, and large areas remain damaged or depopulated.
Several officers argue that the country narrowly avoided a disaster of unprecedented scale and that the lack of accountability or published investigations leaves critical questions unanswered.
Others within the IDF leadership dispute the characterization of systemic failure, insisting that operational plans and intelligence assessments were appropriate.
Yet many current and former officers maintain that the events of October 7 exposed deep vulnerabilities, particularly given that only four battalions—about 3,500 soldiers—were responsible for defending 130 kilometers of mountainous border, with many communities lacking immediate access to weapons due to earlier theft concerns.
The debate over what nearly occurred in the north remains unresolved, but the consensus among those who witnessed the aftermath is that Israel narrowly escaped a far greater tragedy.
