Historically, regimes under this level of pressure have often turned outward.
Hezy Laing
Iran is entering one of the most volatile periods in its modern history, and analysts increasingly warn that the Islamic Republic may attempt to provoke a confrontation with Israel as a way to redirect public attention from its deepening domestic crisis.
The country is facing severe internal unrest, with protests erupting across dozens of cities including Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Ahvaz.
Demonstrations have been fueled by a collapsing economy, a currency that has lost more than 80 percent of its value in recent years, and widespread anger at the ruling elite.
The death toll from clashes between protesters and security forces has risen into the thousands, and tens of thousands have been arrested by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, now in his late eighties, presides over a system that is showing unmistakable signs of strain.
Historically, regimes under this level of pressure have often turned outward.
Political scientists frequently cite examples such as Argentina’s military junta in 1982, which launched the Falklands War to distract from economic collapse, or Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, which followed years of internal discontent.
Iran’s leadership is well aware of this pattern, and its ideological framework—built for decades around hostility toward Israel—makes escalation a tempting tool.
Figures such as IRGC Commander Hossein Salami and Quds Force leaders have repeatedly framed Israel as the source of Iran’s hardships, a narrative designed to unify the population against an external enemy.
Yet Iran also faces significant constraints.
Its military infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted in recent years, including high‑profile assassinations of nuclear scientists such as Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and precision strikes on IRGC facilities attributed to Israel.
The regime knows that a direct missile attack launched from Iranian territory could trigger a massive Israeli response, potentially involving strikes on nuclear sites in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan.
For this reason, Tehran has historically relied on proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen to carry out attacks while maintaining plausible deniability.
The most likely scenario, according to regional analysts, is not a full‑scale Iranian assault but a calibrated escalation through drones, cyberattacks, or proxy militias.
Such actions would generate headlines, inflame regional tensions, and allow the regime to portray itself as defending the nation—without risking the catastrophic consequences of a direct war.
In a moment of profound internal weakness, Tehran may see external confrontation not as a choice but as a survival strategy.
