New Hamas tactics are specifically designed to neutralize the advantages of a conventional army.
By Hezy Laing
The tragic death of four IDF tank soldiers this week has accentuated the need for the shift in tactics in Gaza.
The four were killed when a Hamas fighter managed to get close enough to throw a grenade into their tank – killing them instantly.
This attack was by no means the only one – many other tank crews have been killed in Gaza and many are asking why IDF tanks (unsuited for urban warfare) are in Gaza in the first place.
A growing chorus of military experts now say the IDF must shift from conventional warfare to guerrilla-style tactics in Gaza because the nature of the conflict has fundamentally changed.
Hamas no longer operates as a traditional military force with fixed positions and identifiable front lines.
Instead, it has evolved into a decentralized insurgency that thrives in urban terrain, uses tunnel networks, and relies on ambushes, booby traps, and hit-and-run attacks.
These Hamas tactics are specifically designed to neutralize the advantages of a conventional army.
Traditional military operations—large-scale maneuvers, territorial sweeps, and heavy armor deployments—are ill-suited to Gaza’s densely populated and labyrinthine environment.
The IDF’s reliance on these methods has led to repeated incursions into the same neighborhoods, often without achieving lasting control or dismantling Hamas’s infrastructure.
This cycle of entry, withdrawal, and reentry has strained Israeli forces and exposed them to asymmetric threats, while allowing Hamas to regroup and adapt.
Guerrilla-style warfare, by contrast, emphasizes small-unit agility, real-time intelligence, and surgical precision.
It allows for targeted raids, tunnel-clearing missions, and rapid extraction—tactics that are far more effective in urban combat against an embedded enemy.
The shift would also reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage, which are strategic liabilities that fuel international criticism and undermine Israel’s diplomatic standing.
A guerrilla approach would also prioritize disrupting command networks, isolating fighters from their support bases, and applying pressure in ways that conventional force cannot.
In recent operations, there have been signs that the IDF is beginning to adapt—using corridor strategies, layered infiltration, and drone coordination.
But these shifts need to be formalized into doctrine. Victory in Gaza will not come from overwhelming firepower alone; it will require flexibility, creativity, and a deep understanding of the terrain Hamas has spent years shaping to its advantage.
The battlefield demands a new mindset—one that mirrors the enemy’s adaptability while preserving Israel’s strategic and moral edge.
In addition, military experts say the IDF must impose a siege on Gaza City, because it remains the group’s last major stronghold, housing command centers, tunnel networks, and possibly hostages.
A siege restricts movement, cuts supply lines, and isolates militants from reinforcements and resources. According to Maj. Gen. (Res.) Uzi Dayan, only full territorial control can dismantle Hamas’s operational infrastructure.
The IDF’s strategy must involves encircling the city, seizing strategic junctions, and applying pressure until Hamas collapses.
Without a siege, Hamas can regroup, survive underground, and continue guerrilla attacks, prolonging the conflict and undermining Israel’s goal of a decisive military victory.
