The clandestine usage underscore that states frequently prioritize access to cutting-edge technology over ideological positions.
By Hezy Laing
Despite the absence of diplomatic relations with Israel, intelligence services in Pakistan and Bangladesh have reportedly acquired Israeli surveillance technologies through covert channels, raising questions about legality, secrecy, and geopolitical implications.
In Pakistan, investigative reports have revealed that the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and police units began using Israeli cyber intelligence software as early as 2012.
The supplier identified was Cellebrite, an Israeli company specializing in digital forensics tools capable of extracting data from mobile phones and encrypted devices.
These tools were deployed to combat organized crime, espionage, and terrorist financing.
Allegations have also surfaced that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has engaged in discreet cooperation with the Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency, when mutual security interests aligned, despite the country’s official ban on trade and recognition of Israel.
The revelations sparked controversy in Islamabad, where public opinion remains strongly opposed to any ties with Israel, and critics warned of potential fallout with regional actors such as Iran and Afghanistan.
Bangladesh has faced similar scrutiny.
Export records and investigative journalism have shown that Dhaka purchased spyware and surveillance systems from companies run by Israeli businessmen, often routed through third-party firms in Europe, Cyprus, and Singapore.
In 2022, Bangladesh reportedly acquired the SpearHead surveillance platform, developed by a company linked to former Israeli military intelligence officers.
The Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), Bangladesh’s principal military intelligence agency, was named as a recipient of such technologies.
These acquisitions contradict both Israeli export regulations, which restrict sales to countries without diplomatic ties, and Bangladeshi import laws, which formally prohibit trade with Israel.
If Israel retains backdoor access to the surveillance technologies, it could theoretically monitor sensitive communications, track intelligence operations, and gather geopolitical insights.
But such a scenario would expose both nations to external espionage risks, undermining sovereignty and fueling mistrust in already fragile regional relations.
The deals were conducted covertly, highlighting how intelligence priorities often override political and legal barriers.
Both Pakistan and Bangladesh officially ban imports from Israel and maintain policies of non-recognition, yet their intelligence agencies have sought advanced surveillance capabilities to strengthen counterterrorism and internal security operations.
The clandestine purchases underscore a broader reality in global intelligence: states frequently prioritize access to cutting-edge technology over ideological positions.
While these arrangements may enhance operational capacity, they also raise concerns about oversight, accountability, and human rights, particularly regarding the potential use of spyware against political opponents, journalists, and activists.
