“A technocratic government would sit atop an existing system staffed by tens of thousands of Hamas‑aligned employees.”
By Hezy Laing
The world media has been full of praise for Trump’s proposed solution for administering Gaza.
For example, The Times (UK) claimed that “Trump’s proposal for a post‑Hamas administrative structure in Gaza is the first plan in years that attempts to combine security control with a realistic path to reconstruction.” The paper also noted that European governments were “quietly receptive” to its emphasis on oversight.
But several analysts argue that the idea of forming a so‑called “technocratic government” in Gaza is less a genuine attempt at political reform and more a mechanism that would allow Hamas to continue exerting influence from the shadows.
They warn that such a framework would sit atop an existing system still staffed by tens of thousands of Hamas‑aligned employees and protected by a substantial armed wing that remains active in the Strip.
Any civilian cabinet presented as independent would struggle to function without relying on the same networks that Hamas has built over nearly two decades of rule.
Because of this, they contend that Israel must navigate its discussions with Washington carefully, insisting on strict oversight and clearly defined limits to prevent Hamas from reconstituting its authority under a new label.
Similar concerns have been raised in past international efforts to install technocratic bodies in conflict zones, where armed groups retained real power despite nominal administrative changes.
Yoni Ben‑Menachem, a longtime analyst of Gaza politics, argues that the proposed Gaza administration would consist of roughly a dozen figures—mostly former senior Palestinian Authority officials—alongside individuals acceptable to or influenced by Hamas.
He notes that the day‑to‑day functioning of Gaza would still depend on the existing bureaucracy of approximately 40,000 employees who have long been paid by Hamas‑linked institutions.
International organizations, including the International Crisis Group and various UN assessments, have similarly observed that Hamas’s civilian apparatus is deeply entrenched and difficult to replace without a comprehensive restructuring effort.
Alongside this civilian network, Ben‑Menachem emphasizes that Hamas’s military infrastructure remains largely intact, estimating that around 30,000 armed operatives continue to operate in the Strip.
He argues that no meaningful disarmament has taken place and that the organization’s command structure still functions covertly.
Michael Milshtein, a former senior IDF intelligence officer and one of Israel’s leading scholars on Palestinian affairs, has echoed these concerns.
He has warned that any governing body operating in Gaza without a full security overhaul risks becoming “a façade that masks Hamas’s continued dominance.”
Milshtein notes that Hamas’s administrative and military branches are deeply intertwined, making it nearly impossible for a civilian authority to function independently unless the organization’s armed capabilities are dismantled and its financial networks disrupted.
His assessments, published through the Institute for National Security Studies and other research bodies, stress that without structural change, Hamas will likely reassert influence even under the guise of a neutral technocratic framework.
Given these conditions, these experts that Israel must act with caution.
With regional tensions high and U.S. diplomatic support essential, he believes Israel should insist on robust monitoring mechanisms and enforceable constraints on any new administrative body.
Without such safeguards, they warn, the proposed technocratic framework could inadvertently help Hamas rebuild its political and military strength rather than diminish it.
