A U.S. State Department report from November 1995 already counted 18,000 personnel when the ceiling was 9,000.

By Hezy Laing

The Oslo Interim Agreement envisioned a limited Palestinian police force, not a standing army.

Annex I defined the “Palestinian Police” as a civil body tasked with maintaining public order, preventing crime, protecting infrastructure, and combating terrorism.

Its size was capped at 12,000 personnel in Judea and Samaria, with strict limits on weapons: 4,000 assault rifles, 4,000 pistols, 120 machine guns, and 15 riot-control vehicles.

Even Hebron’s H‑1 sector was to host only 400 policemen with 200 pistols. Israel retained an absolute veto over every recruit: any candidate Israel rejected “shall not be recruited.”

The reality diverged almost immediately. A U.S. State Department report from November 1995 already counted 18,000 personnel when the ceiling was 9,000. By 1997 the force reached 32,000.

In 2001—when Israel designated Force 17 and the Tanzim as terror organizations—the number was 40,000. By 2003 it climbed to 52,000, and by 2006 to 61,051.

Today, the force stands at roughly 70,000, nearly six times the agreed limit, positioned in the territory closest to Israel’s population core.

Attempts to downplay the size do not withstand scrutiny. A 2023 DCAF report claimed 34,000, but Lt.-Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch shows this is impossible: a 25% manpower collapse would appear in payroll.

It does not. The PA Ministry of Finance paid 3.153 billion shekels to its security apparatuses in 2017 and 3.078 billion in 2025—essentially unchanged.

This is not a police force. Ordinary policing does not require armored warfare, artillery, sniping, heavy machine guns, or parachute training.

Yet these are part of the curriculum. Nor does a police force ignore Hamas and Islamic Jihad cells operating openly in its own cities. An entity that trains for war, arms for war, and refuses to fight terrorists is not a police force.

The pattern mirrors a historical precedent few wish to name. After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles imposed strict limits on Germany’s military.

Every limit was quietly evaded, then openly discarded. Foreign powers hesitated to confront the violations, fearing instability. The result was not stability—it was catastrophe.

On October 7th, 6,000 terrorists penetrated 22 kilometers into Israel.

Now imagine a force ten times larger, positioned 14 kilometers from Herzliya.

The conception that such a force can be “managed” or “contained” has already been tested. It failed.